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Digest: In re Jose C.
Megan Krebbeks
Opinion by Werdegar, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, J.,
Baxter, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J.
Issue
Whether the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution, 18 U.S.C. § 3231, or any other provision of federal
law, preempts California Welfare and Institutions Code section
602.
Facts
Federal agents arrested plaintiff Jose C., a minor, after
observing plaintiff leading six other persons through the
California desert just across the Mexican border.1 After the
federal agents transferred plaintiff to state custody, the Imperial
County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602), alleging
a violation of federal immigration law.2 Section 602 gives
California state courts jurisdiction to declare a juvenile who
“violates any law of this state or of the United States . . . to be a
ward of the court.”3 Though the federal courts have “original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses
against the laws of the United States,”4 section 602 enables state
courts to address juvenile violations of federal immigration law.
At trial, plaintiff’s counsel objected on the grounds that the
juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the federal
criminal violations.5 The juvenile court overruled the objection
and declared plaintiff to be a ward of the court, found him guilty
of a felony, and sentenced him to a maximum of ten years
confinement.6 The court of appeal affirmed plaintiff’s conviction.7
The Supreme Court of California granted review to determine
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In re Jose C., 198 P.3d 1087, 1091 (Cal. 2009).
Id.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(a) (West 2008).
18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006).
Jose C., 198 P.3d at 1091–92.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
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whether section 602 gives a state court jurisdiction to declare a
juvenile a ward of the court based on violations of federal law.8
Analysis
In a unanimous opinion, affirming the court of appeal, the
Supreme Court of California observed that section 3231
establishes two general principles. First, federal district courts
may exercise jurisdiction over federal criminal offenses; and
second, state courts may not directly prosecute violations of
federal criminal statutes.9 Plaintiff contended that section 3231
went a step further and argued that section 3231 prohibited state
courts from “interpreting and adjudicating in any proceeding
whether a federal criminal statute has been violated.”10
Plaintiff’s interpretation of section 3231 would have preempted
state court jurisdiction over his case.11 The court was not
persuaded by this argument and held that the juvenile wardship
proceedings did not violate section 3231’s grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal courts and so were not preempted by
The court found that the state court’s
section 3231.12
interpretation and application of federal law posed no threat to
federal interests because state courts were bound by federal
precedent and their interpretations would be subject to direct
review by the United States Supreme Court.13
The court also acknowledged the interplay between state and
federal law enforcement and judicial proceedings:
Congress may pass a law barring a particular act and imposing a
specific punishment, and a state legislature may pass a state law
barring the same act and imposing a different specific punishment, as
well as vesting jurisdiction over violations of the state law in its state
courts, without encroaching upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts to adjudicate violations of the federal law and impose
the federal punishment.14

Plaintiff also argued that the state court adjudication of a
federal immigration offense is preempted as an infringement of
Congress’ exclusive power to regulate immigration.15 The court
found this argument unconvincing. The court noted that federal
criminal law relating to the jurisdiction of immigration matters
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Id.
Id. at 1093.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1094–95.
Id. at 1096.
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makes no mention of state courts.16 While Congress expressly
vested jurisdiction in the federal courts, the “absence of an
express exclusion of state court jurisdiction ‘is strong, and
arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no such intent’”
to preempt state court jurisdiction regarding immigration
matters.17
Next, the court analyzed the four ways in which Congress
may preempt state law: express, conflict, obstacle, and field
preemption.18 In this situation, the court explained, the issue
was one of field and obstacle preemption.19 Field preemption
occurs where Congress intends to preempt all state law in a
particular area by fully enacting comprehensive federal
regulations, thus leaving no space for state regulation.20
Obstacle preemption exists where the challenged state law is an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of purposes and
objectives of Congress.21 The court found no intent by Congress
to fully occupy the field of immigration law and thus preempt
state regulations.22 Similarly, the court found no evidence that
section 602 stood as an obstacle to federal objectives and
purposes.23 Instead, it found that section 602 mirrored federal
objectives and furthered a legitimate state interest.24
Holding
The court held that section 3231 and the exclusive federal
authority over immigration matters did not preempt the state
wardship proceedings that declared plaintiff a ward of the
court.25
Legal Significance
This case affirms the state’s power and authority to conduct
juvenile wardship proceedings even in instances where violations
of federal criminal law are implicated. In doing so, it allows
California to retain some control over immigration matters
within its territory.

Id. at 1097. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2006).
Jose C., 198 P.3d at 1097 (quoting Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494
U.S. 820, 823 (1990)).
18 Id. at 1098–1101.
19 Id. at 1098.
20 Id. at 1099.
21 Id. at 1100.
22 Id. at 1098–99.
23 Id. at 1100–01.
24 Id. at 1101.
25 Id. at 1091.
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